The Global Financial Crisis (GFC) brought to the fore the limits of the Chinese export led-growth strategy and the need for Chinese rebalancing of its international business approaches. Our paper takes stock of what may be the new chapter of Chinese outward-mercantilism, which aims at securing a higher rate of returns on its net foreign asset position, leveraging its success in manufacturing exports, natural resource imports and RMB internationalization. Using micro-level project data and macroeconomic covariates, we find positive association of Chinese trade and financial flows with China's outward direct investment (ODI). The relationship is stronger for ODI originated from the Chinese state-owned enterprises, and strengthened by the provision of RMB swap-line agreements with China's trading partners. The evidences support the conjecture that Chinese ODI is bundled to trade and financial linkages with its investment and trading partners.
Introduction
China has been a prime example of export-led growth that has benefited from learning by doing, and by adopting foreign know-how, supported by a complex industrial policy. Arguably, a modern version of mercantilism has been at work (Aizenman and Lee, 2008) . The rapid growth, growing trade, and current account/GDP surpluses in the 2000s had occurred in tandem with massive hoarding of international reserves (IR) combined with massive sterilization of expanding trade surpluses and financial inflows1. These policies were aimed at delaying and slowing the real appreciation associated with successful rapid growth. Following the Asian crisis of 1997-98, which mitigated Chinese competitiveness in the late 1990s, as well as Chinese accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in the early 2000s, the country intensified its drive toward export-led growth, racking up current-account surpluses and growing stockpiles of international reserves. On the eve of the financial crisis, China's real GDP growth had reached 14%, its current-account surplus had grown to 10% of GDP, and its international reserves had reached about 50% in 2010 (Aizenman, Jinjarak and Marion, 2014) .
The global financial crisis (GFC) of the late 2000s put an abrupt end to the Chinese exportled, growth-cum-large current-account surplus trajectory. In the U.S., the private sector was forced to de-leverage and lower demands for imports. Other crisis-hit developed countries also cut back on imports. Consequently, the GFC and its aftermath induced rapid Chinese internal balancing, reducing the scope of future reserve hoarding. Since the crisis, China's current-account surplus fell from 10% of GDP (2007) to about 2% in 2013. A legacy cost of Chinese policies during the 2000s has been its skewed external balance -long on low-yielding foreign assets (mostly international reserves), and short on high-yielding assets (mostly large liabilities associated with past net FDI inflows to China). While China's net external financial assets in 2013 was about 20% of China's GDP, the real net return on these assets was negative.2 This reflects two fundamental factors --the low real return on Chinese international reserves (two-third of its gross external assets), and the high return on past FDI inflows to China, which accounts for about 60% of Chinese 1 We note that international-reserves accumulation may be the outcome of current account surplus in countries with inferior financial intermediation, and not only mercantilism (Ju and Wei, 2010 ). Yet, running current account surplus does not imply hoarding mostly international reserves, as it may be consistent also with outward FDI, like what has been done by Japan, even if its financial intermediation is inferior to that of other countries. The timing of moving towards Chinese outward FDI around the global financial crisis is consistent with our interpretation. 2 See http://rhg.com/notes/chinas-international-investment-position-2014-update. external liabilities. 3 The low return on Chinese foreign assets is bad news, especially considering the rapid aging of China's population. This is in contrast to Japan, where the sizable return on Japan's foreign asset position helps in buffering the future income of its rapidly graying population.
A way of mitigating the adverse consequences of Chinese legacy external balance sheet exposure is external rebalancing, that is "swapping" overtime some of its international reserves with higher yielding foreign equities and Chinese outward direct investment (ODI). Indeed, China embarked on diversifying its holdings of dollar IR by channeling surpluses into a sovereign wealth fund (SWF), encouraging outward foreign direct investment in tangible assets, and offering much higher expected returns. 4 The outcome has been growing ODI in the global resource sectors and infrastructure services, especially in commodity and mineral exporting countries, which includes developing countries and emerging markets in Africa and Latin America. In a way, China has joined the trend of other Emerging Markets (EMs).5
After the GFC, China embarked on large bilateral currency-swap agreements with other countries. This was done in tandem with the unprecedented provisions of swap lines among the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries and the more selective provision of four swap lines by the U.S. Federal Reserve (FED) to selected emerging market economies (Appendix, Table B ). Comparing the bilateral swap lines offered by the U.S.
FED and the People's Bank of China (PBOC) reveals key differences. Most of the swap lines offered by China have been to commodity countries, developing and emerging market economies, whereas most of the bilateral swap lines offered by the U.S. FED are between the OECD countries, and four emerging markets: Brazil, South Korea, Mexico, and Singapore. Aizenman and Pasricha (2010) pointed out that the selection criteria explaining the U.S. FED supply of bilateral swap lines 3 According to the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE), China's external financial assets were about U.S.$ 6 trillion at the end of 2013, of which international reserves were about two-third (U.S. $3.9 trillion), the outbound direct investment about 10%, securities investment about 4%, and other investment at about 20%. The country's external liability position was 4 trillion U.S.$, out of which FDI in China was $2.35 trillion, 60% of the total liability. The investment in securities and other aspects took up 10% and 30%, respectively. 4 On December 19, 2013, the WSJ reported "Beijing will ease the approval process for all but the largest Chinese investments in overseas companies and projects, a major relaxation of regulatory oversight that analysts say is aimed at encouraging Chinese firms to expand abroad." 5 Aizenman and Pasricha (2013) noted that EMs eased outflows of capital more in response to higher stock price appreciation, higher appreciation pressures in the exchange market, higher IR/GDP, and higher real exchange rate volatility.
to emerging markets were close financial and trade ties, a high degree of financial openness, and a relatively good sovereign credit history. Chances are that similar factors account for the Chinese supply of Renminbi (RMB) bilateral swap lines to a growing list of developing and emerging markets, as has been illustrated by Garcia-Herrero and Xia (2015).6 This strategy blends very well with the trade internationalization of the RMB in the context of the broader outward investment strategy of China, and is consistent with the channeling of China's net foreign-asset position into an ODI-cum-credit strategy.
Against this background, our paper takes stock of what may be the new chapter of Chinese outward mercantilism, which is aimed at securing a higher rate of returns on its net foreign asset position, leveraging its success in international trade, and its large net foreign asset position. We conjecture that in the aftermath of the GFC, China has bundled ODI with its finance dealing (lending, swap lines, trade credit), its trade and foreign investment (including exports of Chinese capital products and labor services), and leveraging its growing market clout. This bundling strategy has been mostly applied to developing and emerging market economies, and to "commodity-countries". During the GFC and its aftermath, China increased rapidly its ODI, swaplines, imports and exports in tandem to the selected countries. Such a bundling strategy is consistent with Adams and Yellen (1976) : bundling as a manifestation of market clout in which the bundling party leverages its market powers aimed at increasing its surplus. Accordingly, China may use its market power in the provision of "swap and lender of last resort", supplying capital goods, and infrastructure services to its trading partners.7
The shortness of the sample and the lack of more detailed data do not allow us to evaluate the success of the bundling strategy in delivering higher returns to the Chinese net foreign asset position. The willingness of China to extend credit lines and invest in countries with histories of default, including Argentina, Venezuela, Zimbabwe, raises concerns about the growing exposure of China to sovereign defaults, and the risk of partial nationalization of its ODI assets. One should keep in mind, however, that some Chinese lending to commodity countries is secured by "in kind" 6 Garcia-Herrero and Xia (2015) concluded the choice of countries signing an RMB-denominated bilateral swap agreement with China was predominantly by "gravity motifs"; that is, by country size and distance from China, as well the trade motif in terms of both exports to China and the existence of the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with China. Institutional soundness also matters, since countries with better government and less corruption are more likely to sign an RMB-denominated bilateral swap agreement. 7 Such a bundling strategy may also act as a barrier to entry of late new comers in the destination countries (Nalebuff, 2004) .
long-run payment in the form of oil flows and other commodities to China.8 Arguably, Chinese outside exposure may be also partially hedged by the growing dependence of some developing countries on Chinese infrastructure services needed to maintain their upgraded rail system, and the growing importance of China as the prime destination of their imports (and for some, their dependence on China as their only "lender of last resort").9 During global economic uncertainty, such dependence on Chinese trade and ODI has also become ever more relevant for countries at the early stage of investment development path, where the domestic sector is limited, the innovation system is poorly defined, and natural resource extraction is the main production activity. Our interpretation is also consistent with the evidence that China's ODI drive for natural resources is a recent phenomenon and became prominent after the 'Going Global' policy adopted in 2002 (Cheung et al., 2012) , exemplified by the GFC.10
In the following sections we summarize several regressions analyzing the association among trade, ODI, and finance. We find that Chinese exports of manufactures to and imports of commodities from its trading partners are positively associated with Chinese ODI. The provision of the RMB swap lines strengthens such a linkage. Focusing on Chinese Greenfield ODI and distinguishing between the ODI into tradable sectors, non-tradables sector, and natural resources, we find that Chinese commodities imports influences the natural resources sector ODI. The positive association between Chinese ODI and commodities imports increases with the provision of RMB swap lines to China's trading partners. The influence of RMB swap lines is especially large on the Chinese ODI in the natural resources sector. The overall findings are supportive to the conjecture that in the aftermath of the GFC, Chinese ODI is bundled with trade and financial 8 The Financial Times commented on March 17, 2015 "Credit risks (of Venezuela) are soaring, with the economy set to shrink by as much as 7 per cent this year. The slump in crude prices is clobbering Caracas's ability to finance its debt. The markets are pricing in about a 90 per cent probability that Venezuela will default on its debt over the next five years. Chinese lending may, in effect, be senior to that of international bond holders, secured as it is against 450,000 barrels a day of oil." "Russia's financial arrangements with China are shrouded in mystery, which is reinforced by western sanctions imposed on Moscow since the Ukraine crisis began. However, several analysts put Chinese state-backed lending to Russian corporations at well over $30bn, much of it secured by oil shipments to China." 9 Our conjecture is in line with recent case studies -three out of the largest five industry activities of China's-outward Greenfield FDI are in the natural resources sector, before and after the global financial crisis of 2008-09 [see Table A in the Appendix]. Seven out of ten largest capital investments abroad by Chinese companies have operated in host countries that receive RMB swap-lines in the aftermath of the GFC. 10 See also Cheung and Qian (2009) for the evidence that both market-seeking and resource-seeking motives drive China's ODI; Chinese exports to developing countries induce China's ODI; and China's international reserves promote its ODI.
linkages, thereby increasing the country's influence in the international markets, and securing its long-run access to a stable supply of commodities The contribution of this paper is in identifying the post GFC developments in Chinese ODI.
By the time of GFC, China has become the manufacturing workshop and the major commodity importer of the world, while being one of the largest global creditors with two third of its international assets in safe but low yielding reserves. This juxtaposition has imposed new challenges on China, including securing more stable supply lines of raw material, finding new sources of demand at times of growing access capacity and dwindling global demand for manufacturing, preferably in underserved markets with higher future growth potential, in preparation for the aging of the Chinese work force. Meeting these challenges may be facilitated by encouraging the ODI of China, targeting especially resource rich countries that are challenged by scarcity of engineering knowhow and finance, and relative poverty. A necessary condition for deepening the future trade of China with these countries are lower transportation costs, thereby needing upgraded infrastructure (ports, rail system, highways, stable supply of electricity, etc.).
Our paper shows that these challenges have been accommodated by ODI drive of China, especially in resource rich countries. During recent years, these countries have been the recipients of Chinese ODI, exports of construction and engineering services, and capital goods, as well as the provision of credit and swap lines. This strategy may be a win-win arrangement. Chinese comparative advantage has been its ability to supply relatively reliable and cheap construction infrastructure services and the needed engineering knowhow, supported by supplying the needed capital goods and manufacturing products, with abundance of Chinese credit arrangements. In contrast, the developing countries served by China are abounded with potential supply of commodities and minerals, some with growing market potential due to their young population base, yet challenged by the lack of functioning infrastructure and engineering knowhow, and scarcity of saving and limited access to external funding, in dire needs for better infrastructure, where better ports, rails and highways may be the key for deeper trade integration.
Bundling has been a common practice throughout the history of corporations and countries.
Bundling's welfare implications are ambiguous, as it may be used to reduce cost and improve quality, and for price discrimination (Nalebuff, 2008) . Bundling strategy is important for multinational enterprises (MNEs) to enter foreign market. It has been widely studied in industrial organization and marketing (Adams and Yellen, 1976, Nalebuff, 2004) . We provide empirical evidence of bundling practices in the context of international trade, finance and investment. In recent years, China has established an efficient export platform for manufacture goods and a huge import demand for natural resources. The dominant role of China in manufactory exports and commodity imports may allow it to leverage its market power to promote ODI that is still in the growing stage through bundling strategy. Bundling a successful business with a newer or less successful business is a market tactic to help the latter find its way into a new market. Indeed, it is strategic for multinational enterprises (MNEs) to bundle their specific advantages with the country-specific advantage in order to enter a foreign market.11 Our results highlight trade (in particular import of natural resources) and finance as the comparative advantage of China, based on which MNEs can leverage their market power and promote ODI. The evidence of bundling is robust after controlling for market-seeking, resource-seeking and strategic asset-seeking motives, institutional quality, ownership structure, and other factors that could potentially affect ODI.
Bundling Chinese ODI with investment in infrastructure supported by Chinese credit lines meets the needs of the recipient countries. For China, this strategy may secure cheaper and more enduring trade arrangement. In the first phase, Chinese exports of constructive and infrastructure services, bundled with the needed capital goods deals with the post GFC Chinese access capacity.
The financing of these activities by China increases its attractiveness to the recipient countries, where China is expected to be paid back by the future exports of commodities and raw material from the recipient countries to China. These engagements and the resultant drop in the cost of trade may facilitate deeper future exports of China to growing markets in African, Latin American and Asia, and future selective Chinese outsourcing of its production to selective growing markets.
Our regression analysis confirms these associations, finding that the bundling of trade and credit arrangement with ODI is especially pronounced after the GFC and in the activities of state-owned enterprises (SOE) 12. 11 The complementarity between Chinese ODI in mining commodities in developing countries and export of Chinese manufacturing and infrastructure services may be especially strong in countries challenged by limited access to external borrowing, low saving, and limited experience in building infrastructure, e.g., Argentina, Zimbabwe, Venezuela and others. In these circumstance, better infrastructure reduces the cost of trade. Chinese ODI in mining and minerals may expend the future exports of these countries, providing the hard currency needed to pay for Chinese products, and to service the debt and credit arrangements associated with Chinese upfront investment. Table D for the list of sectors in each group). As the ownership structure is associated with the ODI decisions, we differentiate the ODI flows from SOEs and POEs, and evaluate them separately. SOEs are defined as firms whose ultimate owners are Chinese Outward FDI [OFDI]: (1) the outsourcing of production to locations where domestic technologies are established and global demand is high; (2) the establishment of industrial parks overseas in regions where conditions are advantageous; (3) international exploration and cooperation projects in important energy and natural resources such as oil and gas, iron ore, uranium, copper, and aluminum, and the building of long-term, stable, safe, and diversified multi-channel supply systems for natural resources; (4) the construction of R&D centers in technology-intensive overseas locations and collaboration with foreign R&D institutions and innovative enterprises; and (5) comprehensive engineering projects by capable and capital-rich big corporations; M&As and greenfield investments; the international registration of intellectual property rights; the establishment of global marketing and sales networks and regional sales centers; and global resource configuration and value-chain integration (State Council 2011). Similarly, to a large extent (and consistent with earlier documents) the 12th FDI Five-Year Plan lays out the future development of the OFDI policy framework. It emphasizes the government's role in promoting OFDI in three priority areas: • supporting the active participation of Chinese firms in natural resource projects overseas in order to secure the sustainable, stable, economic, and safe supply of energy and natural resources; • accelerating the implementation of technological upgrading; and • effectively implementing the expansion into foreign markets (NDRC 2012a)." "The 12th FDI Five-Year Plan also encourages capable private enterprises, particularly small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), to engage in OFDI." governments, where ultimate owners are those who own at least 25.01% of the subject firms. The data on firm ownership structure are from ORBIS Bureau van Dijk.
Note that we attempt to be forthcoming in providing both sets of micro and aggregate data We control for a number of country-specific factors. To address the market-seeking motives of Chinese ODI (Buckley, et al, 2007) , we include host country market size, measured by the log of GDP (log(GDP)) from World Development Indicators (WDI). To account for the influence of cultural similarities on trade and ODI (Rauch and Trindade 2002), we include the logarithmic distance between China and host countries (log(Distance)), and a common language indicator (Common Language) that equals to one if a language is spoken by at least 9% of the population in both China and host country, and zero otherwise. As host country institution quality is found to affect ODI, we include the legal-origin variable that indicates whether the host country's legal system is based on common law, French civil law, German civil law or Scandinavian civil law. The measure of cultural similarities and institutional quality are from CEPII.Subsequently, to help address the endogeneity issue that may arise from the feedback between ODI and trade, we instrument trade variables with (i) geographic size (Size), the log of geographic area of host-country territory measured in square of kilometers; (ii) the liner shipping connectivity (Connectivity); and (iii) the logarithmic number of merchant ships registered in host country (Ship). Both Connectivity and Ship measure the marine transport ease of connecting to the rest of the world. The detailed variable definitions and sources are summarized in Appendix Table   E . 
Empirical Analysis
The baseline gravity model for studying the association between Chinese ODI and bilateral trade is specified as follows15: log(ODIjt) = δ1 + γ1 log(Tradejt) + θ1Gravityjt + κ1 yeart + ε1jt ,
where ODIjt refers to different measures of Chinese ODI to host country j in year t (t that China's ODI, bundled with access to finance and the exports of Chinese capital products and labor services, may be a barrier to entry of new comers in the ODI destination countries (Nalebuff, 2004 ).
To conform the existing literature, we study empirical linkages between Chinese ODI and international trade using aggregate data, as well as testing the hypotheses on Chinese bundling strategy using sectoral trade and micro-level ODI project information. 15 Gravity equation has been the benchmark approach to study bilateral FDI; see Buch (2005 Anderson (2010) for a review of theoretical foundation. When disaggregate trade variables are applied, the gravity equation becomes log(ODIjt) = δ1 + γ1 log(Commodity Importsjt-1) + log(Manufactures Exportsjt-1) + θ1Gravityjt-1 + κ1 yeart + ε1jt, where Commodity Importsjt-1 is commodity imported from destination j to China, and Manufactures Exportsjt-1 is the manufactures exported from China to country j in year t-1. China has comparative advantage on commodity imports and manufacture export. In the past decades, it has established efficient manufacture export platforms and accumulated huge demand for commodities. These comparative advantages may allow China to better leverage its market power on international trade to promote ODI that is still on the growing stage. We test the conjecture by disaggregating Chinese bilateral trade into commodity imports and manufacture exports and re-estimating the gravity estimation. The results presented in column 3 of Table 2 suggest that Chinese imports of commodities and exports of manufactures are both positively and 
Aggregate ODI and Trade

Sectoral ODI and Trade
To uncover the channels of effective bundling, we examine the level of investment projects, disaggregating greenfield ODI into tradable, non-tradable and natural resource sector ODI. about acquiring existing firms in host countries. Manufacture exports may be more effective in promoting brownfield ODI than greenfield ODI.
Robustness Checks
To Table 5 , the previous results remain generally robust after controlling for these additional variables. Commodity imports are positively related to different measures of ODI.
The evidence however becomes insignificant in the regression of tradable and non-tradable sector ODI.
The Role of RMB Swap Lines
Although there is a positive relationship between trade and ODI, it remains empirically open whether the RMB internationalization in the past decade has any influence on Chinese ODI.
By providing liquidity buffer in the form of RMB swap lines to emerging-market countries, potentially facing credit constraint, institutional challenges, and commodity price volatility, China can enhance its market power and improve the efficiency of bundling. To test the hypothesis that
Chinese ODI is associated with trade and financial dealing with trading partners, we add the provision of RMB swap lines (Swap), a dummy variable that equals to 1 if there is an effective RMB swap line between PBOC and the central bank of its trading partner j in year t, together with its interactions with commodity imports and manufacture exports in the regression of ODI.
The results in Table 6 shows that the coefficient of the interaction term between log(Commodity Imports) and Swap is positive and statistically significant in the regression of natural resource ODI. It suggests that commodity imports have become more important for
Chinese ODI in natural resource sector with the provision of RMB swap lines. In terms of economic significance, increasing the level of commodities imports from 50th percentile to 75th
percentile is associated with a 60% increase in the natural resource sector ODI in the absence of RMB swap lines, and by 182% in the presence of RMB swap lines. There is no evidence that the provision of RMB swap lines affect other types of ODI. These results remain robust when we restrict the sample period to start from 2008, the first year when RMB swap line is introduced. It suggests that the role of RMB swap is not a reflection of GFC effect. These findings are supportive to the hypothesis that Chinese ODI in natural resource sector is bundled with commodity imports and financial linkages, increasing thereby the economic role of China in developing countries and emerging markets.
Endogeneity Issues
So far we have documented a positive relation between Chinese ODI and trade, which is strengthened by financial linkages. However, the estimation results may be subject to endogeneity issue due to a two-way feedback between asset flows and trade (Aviat and Coeurdacier, 2007) . In the presence of reverse causality, the ordinary least square (OLS) estimations are bias and inconsistent. To address the endogeneity concern, we apply the instrumental variable (IV) approach.
Our IVs include (i) Connectivity, the liner shipping connectivity index from UNCTAD; (ii)
Ship, the log of the number of merchant ships registered in host countries obtained from UNCTAD;
(iii) Size, the log of land size in square kilometers obtained from WDI. Both Connectivity and Ship measure how well host countries are connected to global shipping networks of marine transport.
As the majority of global trades are carried by sea, the ease of marine transport benefit trades, both
Connectivity and Ship are likely to satisfy the relevance criteria18. The variable Size is likely to satisfy the relevance criteria as well because geographic variables are found to be associated with trade (Frankel and Romer, 1999) . Investments that neither target for exporting products and nor require importing inputs are unlikely to gain directly from the ease of marine transport. However, through facilitating trades, well connected marine transport networks are likely to benefit investments that rely on trades indirectly. Thus both Connectivity and Ship are likely to satisfy the exogenous criteria. We screen whether the three IVs satisfy the exogeneous criteria by performing over identification tests.
We first run two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation to explore the relation between trade
and ODI and present the results in Table 7 . The first-stage estimation results in column 1 and 2
suggest that the three IVs, Connectivity, Ship and Size are all significantly related with commodity imports and manufacture exports. The p-value associated with under-identification tests is less than 1% across different measures of ODI (see columns 3-7 in Table 7 ), which confirm that the selected IVs satisfy the relevance criteria. Except for the regression of natural resource ODI, the Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistic from weak-identification test is generally higher than 13.43, the Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values for 10% maximal IV size. It suggests that the chosen instruments are not weak, with the estimation bias of less than 10%. The p-value for the overidentification test is generally more than 10%, suggesting the excluded instruments are uncorrelated with the error term and that the exclusion restriction is satisfied. Overall, these tests support our choices of IVs.
The second-stage estimation results reported in column 3-7 in Table 7 show that commodity imports are positively and significantly correlated with different measures of ODI except for non-tradable sector ODI. The coefficient of commodity imports is the largest in the 18 To reduce costs or avoid regulations, more than half of world's merchant ships are registered in a country other than that of the ship's owners. Therefore it is reasonable to think that Ship affect trade but not vice versa. Moreover, the ease of marine transport is largely determined by a country's geographic location, shipping service capacity, ports efficiency, and regulation. Thus the bilateral trade between China and host country is unlikely to affect the marine transport facilities in host country.
regression of natural resources ODI. The 2SLS results are consistent with previous findings based on OLS estimation, which highlight the role of commodity imports on promoting Chinese ODI, especially those in natural resource sector. 
Before and After Global Financial Crisis
GFC may reshape the investment patterns as it drained out the global market liquidity and slowed down economic growth. To study whether GFC affect the bundling between trade and ODI, we regress measures of ODI on the interaction between the two trade variables (commodity imports and manufacture exports) and a crisis dummy, GFC, which equals to one for the observations after 2007 and zero otherwise. The OLS estimation results are presented in Table 9 .
The coefficients of the interaction term between log(Commodity Imports) and GFC are not statistically significant across different measures of ODI, which provide no evidence that GFC reshape the positive relation between commodity imports and ODI. The coefficients of the interaction term between log(Manufacture Exports) and GFC are positive and statistically 19 It is worth pointing out that, while swap-line agreements are potentially endogenous, the correlation between economic linkages and provision of swap lines is far from prefect. China has trade relationships with most of the countries, yet no significant swap lines established before the crisis. By now China has extended more than thirty RMB swap lines. For instance, China provides no swap line to the US and Venezuela, but has large trade and significant ODI with these countries. Essentially, our analysis points out that post crisis, Chinese ODI and the liquidity needs for improving infrastructure in some developing countries have been associated with the establishments of RMB swap lines.
significant for all measures of ODI, except for natural resource ODI. It suggests that the relation between manufacture exports and ODI is generally strengthened after GFC. The results indicate a stronger bundling effect after the GFC that is leveraged on manufactures exports. The 2SLS estimation results yield similar findings.
Heterogeneity across Firm Ownership
To explore the role of ownership structure on cross-border investment and bundling strategy, we decompose the ODI flows by their source, using micro-level project information. A If the first (second) effect dominates, we expect ODI by SOEs (POEs) to benefit more from Chinese trade and financial dealings. If the two effects offset each other, ownership structure shall not make a difference on the relation between ODI and trade as well as finance. We explore the role of ownership structure by running OLS estimation for both SOE and POE related ODI and summarize the results in Panel A and B of Table 10 respectively.
The tradable sector ODI is positively associated with commodity imports for SOEs and
POEs. The χ2 test yields a statistics of 0.05 with a p-value that is higher than 10%, which cannot reject the null hypothesis that the coefficient of log(Commodity Imports) is the same for tradable ODI oriented from SOEs and POEs. Similarly, the χ2 test suggests no evidence that non-tradable and natural resources ODI by SOEs benefit more from the commodity imports than their peers by POEs20. However, we do find that commodity imports are more closely related to the aggregate greenfield ODI by SOEs than those by POEs. We find no evidence that manufacture exports have different impacts on ODI oriented from SOEs and POEs. The results suggest that overall all, on an aggregate level, SOEs benefits more from commodity imports than POEs in their outward investment.
We then explore whether the role of central bank swap lines differs between SOE-and POE-oriented ODI. In Table 11 , the coefficient of the interaction term between log(Commodity Imports) and Swap is positive and statistically significant for natural resource ODI from both SOEs and POEs (shown respectively in Panel A and B). The coefficient of this interaction term is 2.38 in the regression of natural resource ODI by SOEs, which is more than two times of that by POEs.
Testing the difference of the two coefficients yields a χ2 statistics of 7.12 with a p-value of less than 1%. It suggests that RMB swap lines benefit natural resource ODI from SOEs more than those from POEs.
Concluding remarks
The results of our paper are in line with the conjecture that China has bundled its ODI with trade and finance dealing, thus leveraging its growing market clout. This outward mercantilism has been mostly applied to developing and emerging market economies, and to "commodity Notes: The diamond chart plots, based on bilateral data, the relationship of Chinese outward direct investment (ODI), exports, imports, and RMB swap lines, all measured as a ratio of host country (trading partner)'s GDP, weighted by the sample means. The dotted, dashed and solid lines plot, respectively, the relationships before, during, and after the Global Financial Crisis. The host countries (trading partners) are listed in Appendix Trade is the sum of bilateral exports and imports between China and the host country, GDP is the gross domestic product in host country, Distance is the population-weighted distance between China and the host country in kilometres, Common Language is a dummy variable that equal to one if the host country share the same language with China. Leg_French, Leg_German, Leg_Scandinavian, and Leg_Socialist, are dummy variables that equal to one if the legal origin of host country is, respectively, French, Germany, Scandinavian, and Socialist. Detailed variable definitions are provided in Appendix Table E . Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses, with *** (**, *) signifies statistical significance at 1 (5, 10) % level.
(1) Table 2 and year fixed effects (not reported). Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are in parentheses, with *** (**, *) signifying statistical significance at 1 (5, 10) % level.
(1) Table 9 . Chinese ODI and Trade Before and After the Global Financial Crisis.
Notes: GFC is a dummy variable that equals to 1 from year 2008 onwards, and zero otherwise. All regressions control for gravity variables described in Table 2 and year fixed effects (not reported). Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are in parentheses, with *** (**, *) signifying statistical significance at 1 (5, 10) % level. The total Chinese trade (import plus export) with country i at year t China Statistical Yearbook Cultural Similarity
Distance
The distance between China and the host country in kilometers weighted by the population (to account for population density)
CEPII
Common language A dummy variable that equals to 1 if at least 9% of the host country population speak the same language with that of China. 
Instrumental Variable
